Unprecedented Steps for Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance
– Achievements of the “2+2” Meeting on October 29 –

Embassy of Japan
November 30, 2005

1. Overview

On the morning of October 29 th, Japan ’s Foreign Minister Machimura and Defense Minister Ohno visited Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld at the Pentagon to hold the second U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting in 2005. This high-profile meeting of the SCC, which is also called the “2+2” meeting, epitomizes the solidarity of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. At this “2+2” meeting, Japan and the United States concurred on a set of initiatives and recommendations, which were set forth in the Security Consultative Committee Document “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” These measures constitute a major step in the joint endeavor to render our alliance more responsive to emerging challenges and more effective into the future.

2. Historic Achievements of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

There are two major driving forces that have brought an economic boost and political stability to the Asia-Pacific region: one is the principles of freedom and democracy; and the other is free market economy which has advanced globalization. The Japan-U.S. alliance has functioned as a key structure to maintain peace and security in the Asia Pacific by strongly supporting the principles of freedom and democracy as well as free market economy.

Regional and global security situations, however, are rapidly changing. At the “2+2” meeting on October 29, Japan and the United States confirmed their shared view that emerging threats are now posed by such common challenges as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The two countries also concurred that persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, such as North Korean, engender uncertainty and unpredictability, underscoring the need to pay cautious attention to the modernization of military capabilities in the region.

These concerns are what motivated Japan and the United States to launch close bilateral consultations on the Alliance in December 2002. The first major achievement since then lies in the adoption of the “Common Strategic Objectives,” which were crystallized in the Joint Statement issued at the “2+2” meeting on February 19 this year.

The adoption of a set of initiatives and recommendations at the “2+2” meeting on October 29 constitutes the second major achievement. The initiatives and recommendations included in the SCC Document embody the joint endeavor to identify prescriptions for further enhancing the alliance capability. These developments should be regarded as the most significant overhaul of the U.S.-Japan Alliance in its history. It is not only because of the accelerated relocation of Futenma Air Station of the U.S. Marine Corps. It is also because of the cooperative undertaking to render the Alliance more responsive to emerging security situations and more effective for the future.

3. Enhancing the Alliance Capability

Japan and the United States have consulted in light of their shared commitment to maintain the Alliance ’s deterrence and capabilities as well as alleviating burdens on local communities around the U.S. bases in Japan .

Bilateral security cooperation remains vital for the defense of Japan and the stability of the Asia Pacific given the current regional situation. And also, Japan-U.S. cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the Alliance . In fact, as the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) 2004 has already made clear, Japan intends to expand the Self-Defense Forces’ missions for this purpose.

Based on the idea mentioned above, Japan and the United States have examined new roles, missions, and capabilities in specific areas of cooperation such as: ballistic missile defense (BMD); counter-proliferation operations; counter-terrorism; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); humanitarian relief operations; reconstruction assistance; and mutual logistics support activities. The Japan-U.S. Alliance will become operationally more robust and more responsive to changes and contingencies in the strategic environment in the future. From this point of view, both countries intend to pursue better policy and operational coordination, to enhance information and intelligence cooperation, and to improve interoperability. In these efforts, Japan is willing to assume greater responsibility for regional and global security and to take necessary measures to establish effective posture.

4. Force Posture Realignment

(1) In the consultations on force posture realignment, both the Japanese and the U.S. governments took into account various precepts including the following:

(a) First, the forward presence of U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific region continues to be indispensable to regional peace and security.

(b) Second, the importance of enhancing public support should be recognized for the purpose of contributing to the sustainable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan . From this standpoint, both countries should recognize that Japan is the “host” and U.S. Forces stationed in Japan are the “tenant.” This “host and tenant relationship” needs to define responsibilities of both countries.

(c) Third, shared use of facilities between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. Forces (USF) will be pursued to promote bilateral defense cooperation. Collocating military facilities of both Japanese and U.S. Forces will enable more effective operational cooperation.

(d) Fourth, enhanced coordination and interoperability between the SDF and USF will be critically important for flexible response to contingencies. From this point of view, bilateral coordination at the headquarters level between the SDF and USF should be strengthened.

(2) Based on the precepts mentioned above, the last “2+2” meeting on October 29 produced a list of initiatives including the following:

(a) Okinawa: Approximately 7,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam. This relocation could lead to the reduction of burdens on local communities around the U.S. bases in Okinawa. It should be noted, however, that both Japan and the United States seriously considered the need to maintain the alliance capability. In this regard, both countries took into account various factors including technological advancement such as the introduction of high speed vessels (HSV). Japan will work with the United States to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to realize this relocation. Both countries also formulated an accelerated plan of the relocation of Futenma Air Station, while taking account of various requirements such as to maintain the capability and to mitigate impacts on local communities.

(b) Iwakuni: The carrier jet squadron will be relocated from Atsugi to Iwakuni to ensure the viability of a long term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier. Along with this relocation, some other military assets of both Japan ’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. Forces (USF) will be relocated, with a view to the effectiveness of collocation of those assets.

(c) Yokota: The SDF’s Air Defense Command will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base for better coordination.

(d) Zama: The U.S. Army’s command and control capabilities in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters.

5. Further Consultations for Implementing the Initiatives of the “2+2” Meeting

Beginning now, both governments will work on to implement the initiatives and recommendations included in the SCC Document of the “2+2” meeting on October 29 . The U.S.-Japan Alliance is strong. However, as fifteen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, fundamental changes in the region and around the globe are pressing both countries to move forward proactively. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has never been as strong as it is; however, the Alliance is now required to be even stronger. Our endeavors to strengthen the Alliance will continue.

6. Related Links

(1) The “2+2” Meeting on October 29, 2005
　　* Press Release (Embassy of Japan)
　　　http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/pressreleases/2005/103105.htm
　　* Security Consultative Committee Document (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
　　　 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html
　　* Transcript of the Joint Press Briefing (U.S. Department of Defense)
　　　 http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20051029-secdef4183.html

(2) The “2+2” Meeting on February 19, 2005
　　* Press Release (Embassy of Japan)
　　　 http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/pressreleases/2005/022305a.htm
　　* Joint Statement (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
　　　 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html

(3) The “2+2” Meetings (2000-Present) (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
　　http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/index.html

(4) Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
　　http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/index.html